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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF 
COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of the above-
entitled case because it involves the conviction of the Appellant 
on the charge of Unlawful Possession Of A Controlled Substance 
With Intent To Distribute For Value, a second degree felony. The 
conviction occurred in the Third District Court and jurisdiction 
is granted the Utah Court of Appeals by U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The nature of the proceedings is that of a criminal case 
brought by the State of Utah against the Appellant and involved a 
conviction on a felony of the second degree pursuant to U.C.A. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (as amended, 1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review in this Appeal: 
1. The affidavit in support of the search warrant is 
insufficient because it fails to establish the reliability or 
veracity of either confidential informant as required by the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
2. The evidence seized from the Appellant's person should 
be suppressed because the search violated his Constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
3. The seizure of united states currency and a soft plastic 
bag containing balloons with a powdery substance was not a 
legitimate seizure pursuant to a "pat down" search. 
4. All alleged incriminating statements of the Appellant 
should be suppressed since Appellant could not speak English well 
enough to understand the nature of his Miranda rights, nor to 
enter valid waiver thereto. 
5. Statements made by the Appellant after he invoked his 
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent should be suppressed. 
6. Appellant's statements were "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" and should be suppressed. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES 
OR ORDINANCES AND RULES SET OUT VERBATIM 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized* 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated; and no warrants shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing 
to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-7-16: 
Authority of peace officer to frisk suspect for 
dangerous weapon — Grounds. A peace officer 
who has stopped a person temporarily for 
questioning may frisk the person for a 
dangerous weapon if he reasonably believes 
he or any other person is in danger. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal in a criminal case from a judgment of con-
viction entered against the Appellant for the offense of Unlawful 
Possession Of A Controlled Substance With Intent To Distribute For 
Value by the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson on October 30, 1987. 
In the lower court proceedings, Appellant filed a Motion to 
Suppress Evidence on April 14, 1986 and the court granted in part 
and denied in part said Motion on July 22, 1986. Further, on 
August 19, 1987, Appellant filed a Motion To Clarify Court Ruling 
On Suppression of Evidence and said Motion was denied by the 
court on or about September 28, 1987. The effect of the disposi-
tion of these orders was that certain evidence was introduced at 
trial and used against Appellant by the State. The Notice of 
Appeal was filed in the Utah Court of Appeals on December 1, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about January 14, 1986, an affidavit for search 
warrant was signed under oath before the Honorable Sheila K. 
McCleve, a magistrate for the Fifth Circuit Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, by Detective John Conforti of the 
Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office (See Affidvait For Search 
Warrant, Addendum, Exhibit A). Judge McCleve on January 14, 
1986 then issued a search warrant for the premises known as 
88 53 Julia Lane (3255 South) in the City of Salt Lake, County of 
Salt Lake, State of Utah (See Addendum, Exhibit B). 
Pursuant to said search warrant, deputies of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Office assisted by other police agencies, 
arrived at the Julia Lane residence on or about January 15, 1986 
at approximately 9:00 p.m. Upon arriving, Officers under the 
direction of Detective Conforti, began a search of the residence. 
Officer James Upton found a .38 caliber pistol under a bed be-
tween a mattress and box spring in the residence. In the closet 
of a bedroom, he found five rounds of .357 caliber ammunition 
wrapped up in a sock; said ammunition was not usable in the 
pistol found. No other guns or ammunition were found in the 
residence (R. 285 p. 6, 12, 15). Officer Upton also searched the 
bedroom, described to be the North bedroom, and found two 
balloons within a plastic-like baggie material containing a black 
tar substance suspected to be heroin, as well as a syringe and 
silver colored metal canister (R. 285 p. 8). Officer Upton was 
still in the process of his search in the North bedroom, and 
there was no evidence that he had found the heroin, when the 
Appellant and two other individuals arrived (R. 285 p. 11, 14). 
Appellant's arrival was approximately 9:55 p.m.; and upon his 
arrival, Detective Conforti testified that Appellant stated, "I 
live here, what's going on?" (R. 285 p. 25). Appellant testified 
that when he arrived at his home that evening, police officers 
pulled him by the hair and threw him up against a wall with 
pistols to his back and searched him (R. 283 p. 41-42). One 
police officer shouted, "Bingo" as they searched his pockets. He 
was never informed what was found in his pockets and could not 
see what the police were pulling from them (R.283 p. 42). In 
fact, Detective Conforti and the other officers removed 96 common 
balloons containing a white powdery substance in a cellophane bag 
from one jacket pocket and $1,320.00 in cash apparently distri-
buted between a second jacket pocket and a pants pocket (R. 28 5 
p. 28). Detective Conforti testified that the search was con-
ducted only for the officers1 safety and because weapons had been 
found in the house. Detective Conforti specifically admitted he 
withdrew the "soft" money and balloons from Appellant's pocket 
while searching for weapons (R. 285 p. 43-44). 
In the preliminary hearing in the matter, a transcript of 
which was used as evidence in the Motion To Suppress hearing held 
on or about July 22, 1986, (for which said preliminary hearing 
testimony was considered by the court by stipulation of the par-
ties) (R. 284 p. 27, 42, 43), Detective Conforti had testified, 
"Initially I was conducting the search for weapons because we had 
found a hand gun in the house already. After it was determined 
that he was a resident of the house, I felt that he fell under the 
jurisdiction of the search warrant in conducting a more thorough 
search." (R. 168). Of course, the search warrant in the officers1 
possession did not contain authorization to search any particular 
person, or even residents of the house in question (See Addendum, 
Exhibit B). After the search of the Appellant, he was Mirandized 
and the search of the house continued (R. 285 p. 35). 
A further search of the house turned up $9,550.00 in cash in 
a kitchen drawer (R. 285 p. 37). Another individual who came to 
the house and was arrested had $7,250.00 in cash removed from his 
person (R. 285 p. 63). A third individual was searched and 23 
packets of heroin were found on his person (R. 285 p. 51). 
Another individual who arrived at the house was searched and a 
"hype kit and rolling papers" were taken from his person (R. 285 
p. 63). 
Defense counsel appropriately objected to testimony con-
cerning the introduction of not only the evidence found on 
Appellant's person, but the use of the evidence found in the home 
and on the persons of all the other defendants, both in a pre-
trial motion to suppress evidence and again at trial (R. 37, 39, 
285 p. 12, 13, 34, 53, 54, 63, 77). 
Appellant testified that he had only been staying at the 
Julia Lane house approximately 7-8 days when his arrest occurred 
(R. 283 p. 31). During that time, he slept on the couch in the 
living room (R. 283 p.32). Also at that time, he met the other 
arrested individuals at the house for the first time (R. 283 p. 
34). Appellant denys ever seeing large sums of money in the 
house (R. 283 p. 36), and testified that he had never seen the 
package of 96 balloons prior to having them pulled from the 
jacket and did not know there was a large amount of cash in the 
jacket pocket. He testified he only had $25.00 in his pants 
pocket (R. 283 p. 37). 
Appellant further testified that he had gone to a Mexican 
restaurant to eat on the night of January 15, 1986 with two other 
residents of the home who were also arrested, and had been given 
a coat by co-defendant Roberto Villalobos to put on since it was 
cold and he had not brought his own coat. He had only had Mr. 
Villalobos1 coat on for a short time prior to arriving at the 
house and had not looked in the pockets of the coat (R. 283 p. 40). 
After being searched by police officers at the Julia Lane resi-
dence , he was then taken into the North bedroom and was 
questioned by police officers (R. 283 p.42). 
Initially, Appellant told Detective Conforti and other offi-
cers he did not wish to answer questions (R. 284 p. 29). The 
Appellant testified that while he understood some English, he did 
not understand the language very well and had to ask police offi-
cers to repeat their questions and statements to him when they 
resumed questioning. He further pretended to understand what he 
was being told and tried to give the answers the police officers 
wanted even though he did not fully understand the questions (R. 
283 p. 43, 44; R. 284 P. 12, 13). Appellant denied understanding 
the "Miranda warning" and denied he understood he had a right to 
an attorney (R. 284 p. 11; R. 283 p. 43, 44). 
Over defense counsel's objection, the prosecuting attorney 
asked Appellant on cross-examination about a conversation he had 
had with an Officer Jay Labrum, who had transported him to jail 
that night (R. 283 p. 87-91). Appellant talked about the conver-
sation with Officer Labrum only after the court had overruled 
defense counsel's objection, which was later properly put on the 
record outside the presence of the jury (R. 283 p. 58, 59, 72, 
83, 89). 
Officer Jay Labrum was then called to testify in rebuttal by 
the State of Utah and Officer Labrum related statements made by 
the Appellant in response to questions by him as he was trans-
porting the Appellant to jail on the night in question (R. 283 p. 
98, 99). Among such statements allegedly made to Officer Labrum 
were statements by the Appellant that he had been selling "dope" 
and he had made $15,000.00 over the past six months (R. 283 p. 90). 
In addition, Appellant allegedly said defendant Villalobos was 
holding his money, (approximately $7,250.00 was found on the per-
son of defendant Villalobos) (R. 283 p. 91). Appellant's attor-
ney strenuously objected to the admission of such evidence (R. 
283 p. 89). Appellant was ultimately convicted by the jury of 
the offense of Possession Of A Controlled Substance With Intent 
To Distribute For Value, and was sentenced by the court to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen 
(15) years in the Utah State Prison (R. 267). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant is insuf-
ficient because it fails to establish the reliability or veracity 
of either confidential informant as required by the Fourth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 
of the Utah Constitution. 
The evidence seized from the Appellant's person should be 
suppressed because the search violated his constitutional right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The seizure of united states currency and a soft plastic bag 
containing balloons with a powdery substance was not a legitimate 
seizure pursuant to a "pat down" search. 
All alleged incriminating statements of the Appellant should 
be suppressed since Appellant could not speak english well enough 
to understand the nature of his Miranda rights, nor to enter 
valid waiver thereto. 
Statements made by the Appellant after he invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent should be suppressed. 
Appellant's statements were "fruit of the poisonous tree" 
and should be suppressed. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE SEARCH WARRANT IS 
INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE IT FAILS TO ESTABLISH THE 
RELIABILITY OR VERACITY OF EITHER CONFIDENTIAL 
INFORMANT AS REQUIRED BY THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The test for determining the sufficiency of an affidavit 
based on an informant's tip was established by the United States 
Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and 
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969 ) f which holds: 
The Fourth Amendment requires that affidavits 
based on informant's tips must set out 
'underlying circumstances' sufficient (1) to 
reveal the basis of informant's knowledge and 
(2) to establish the veracity of the informant 
or alternativelyf the reliability of his report 
in a particular case. 
State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203, 1205 (Utah 1984) 
(citing Aguilar - Spinelli.) 
The United States Supreme Court recently modified the two-
prong Aguilar - Spinelli test in favor of a "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 46 2 U.S. 213 
(1983). Under Gates, the Aguilar - Spinelli test is not to be 
"mechanically applied" but is to be more flexible by allowing a 
magistrate to make a "common sense" decision based on the cir-
cumstances put forth in the affidavit. Gates, at 232. In other 
words, a deficiency in one prong can arguably be overcome by a 
strong showing as to the other prong. 
Many courts have flatly refused to "follow blindly, the 
lead of the United States Supreme Court" in Gates, and have pre-
ferred to follow the "established jurisprudence of Aguilar -
Spinelli which requires that each prong have "independent" status 
in insuring the validity of the information. State v. Jackson, 
688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984). The Utah Supreme Court has also 
refused to abandon the Aguilar - Spinelli test realizing that a 
"common sense" decision still requires a consideration of both 
veracity and basis of knowledge: 
However, even under this standard compliance with 
the Aguilar - Spinelli guidelines may be necessary 
to make a sufficient basis for probable cause. . . 
a showing of the basis of knowledge and veracity 
or reliability of the person providing the 
information for a warrant may well be necessary 
to establish with a 'fair probability1 that the 
evidence sought actually exists and can be found 
where the informant states. 
State v. Bailey, supra, at 120 5. 
See also, State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985). 
In both Bailey and Anderson the Utah Supreme Court found 
that there were sufficient underlying circumstances to support 
the reliability and credibility of the informant. The criteria 
relied upon by the court in arriving at that conclusion is 
completely absent in the affidavit for search warrant in the 
instant case. The information offered to establish the reliabi-
lity of confidential informant #1, set forth in the affidavit is 
as follows: 
Another C.I. (#2) has stated that drugs, 
specifically heroin is and has been sold 
out of the residence of 8853 Julia Lane 
for some time. 
(See Appendix A). 
There is no information offered whatsoever to establish the basis 
of knowledge, veracity, or reliability of confidential informant 
#2, yet his information is used as the sole basis for confidential 
informant #l's reliability. Under both Aguilar - Spinelli and 
Gates, confidential informant #2's information is insufficient. 
Confidential informant #2's information can't be used to support 
the reliability or veracity of confidential informant #1 without 
some basis for confidential informant #2's knowledge, reliability 
or veracity. 
The criteria the Utah Supreme Court looked to in determining 
whether the affidavits in Bailey and Anderson supported the 
informant's veracity is whether the informant had previously 
given truthful information to the police concerning the existence 
of contraband. Bailey, at 1206; Anderson, at 1102. An infor-
mant's "track record" is an accepted method for establishing his 
veracity. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967). The infor-
mant's "track record" refers to whether "he has provided accurate 
information to the police a number of times in the past." State 
v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136 (Wash. 1984). 
No "track record" is provided in the affidavit in this case. 
At the time the search warrant was sought, Deputy Conforti states 
that confidential informant #1 had been used for one week., Even 
if this information had been in the affidavit, under Bailey and 
Anderson "one week" would not constitute a "track record." 
Moreover, there is no conceivable way the officer's testimony at 
the preliminary hearing or trial can now be used to support the 
information in the affidavit when it was initially a prerequisite 
to obtaining the warrant. 
As to verification, the only information offered to support 
confidential informant #l's information is its corroboration by 
yet another confidential informant for which there is no basis of 
knowledge, reliability or veracity. By contrast, in Bailey and 
Anderson there was "verification of significant facts" by the 
officers. In Bailey, the affidavit "carefully set out and out-
lines the sources of verification of each factor." Bailey at 
106. In Anderson, the police had verified "all but one piece of 
information" received from the informant. Anderson, at 1102. 
Moreover, in Bailey, the reliability of the informant's statement 
was supported by the "detail" with which he described his 
"personal observation". Bailey, at 106. Understandably, the 
magistrate had a "substantial basis" for concluding that probable 
cause existed. 
In this case, the magistrate was provided no basis. It is 
almost impossible to ever test the sufficiency of the affidavit 
because it is so completely void of the standard requirements 
viewed by the court. It sets forth no "track record," no 
"verifiction of significant facts," and no "detailed personal 
observations." In short, neither prong of Aguilar - Spinelli is 
met, making the affidavit insufficient under Bailey and Anderson, 
As the Utah Supreme Court recognized in Anderson: 
"The basis of the affiant's knowledge must be 
set forth in the affidavit together with some 
evidence supporting the veracity of the 
informant when the affidavit includes allega-
tions of a confidential informant. Without 
such a foundation, a warrant becomes a "mere 
charade" and the basic liberty protected by 
the Fourth Amendment would constitute an 
unenforceable right or more realistically, 
no right at all." 
Anderson, at 1103 (Stewart J. Concurring). 
The court's error in issuing the search warrant due to the 
insufficient affidavit in this case was amplified by the court's 
denial of Appellant's motion to disclose the names of the two 
unnamed confidential informants (R. 85, R. 91). Despite coun-
sel's reference to the "legendary" case of Cannon v. Keller, 
692 P.2d 740 (Utah 1984), the record does not reflect an adequate 
showing by the State of harm from disclosure, and Appellant main-
tains that the lower court's failure to disclose the names of the 
confidential informants relied upon compounded Judge McCleve's 
error is issuing the search warrant, and violated Appellant's 
Constitutional rights as indicated previously. 
II. THE EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE APPELLANT'S 
PERSON SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE SEARCH 
VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE FREE 
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. Art. IV. It is 
therefore a well-established rule that a warrant authorizing the 
search of a premises does not extend to authorize the search of a 
person found on the premises. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 
92 (1979). Though Ybarra involved the unauthorized search of a 
person in a public tavern while executing a warrant to search the 
premises, the rule applies equally to persons found on "private" 
premises. State v. Broadnax, 654 P.2d 96 (Wash. 1982); State v. 
Rollie, 701 P.2d 1123 (Wash.Ct. App. 1985); State v. Lambert, 38 
CRL 2265 (Kan.Sup.Ct. Dec. 1985); State v. Weber, 668 P.2d 475 
(Or.Ct.App. 1983). 
The Ybarra rule is subject only to two exceptions. First, 
when officers have a reasonable suspicion that an individual is 
armed and dangerous, the individual may be "patted down" for 
weapons. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The scope of a 
search for weapons is limited to a "patting of the outer clothing 
of the suspect for concealed objects capable of use as instru-
ments of assault." Broadnax, at 100 (citing Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40 (1968)). The second exception to Ybarra allows offi-
cers to "detain" an "occupant" of the premises while executing a 
warrant to search the premises for contraband. Michigan v. 
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1980). A "search" of a person is 
authorized under Summers only if (1) the search of the premises 
results in evidence establishing probable cause to arrest that 
person, and (2) that person has in fact been arrested. Summers, 
at 695-96, n.4. 
In this case, a search warrant was issued which authorized 
only a search of the "premises" where the Appellant resided. No 
person is named in the warrant or the affidavit supporting the 
warrant. (App. B). Under Ybarra, the Appellant then could not be 
searched pursuant to the warrant. Because a gun had been found 
on the premises, arguably a pat down frisk of the Appellant was 
justified under the Terry exception. However, there were other 
occupants in the house and no reason to believe the gun belonged 
to the Appellant. 
According to Deputy Conforti's testimony, the Appellant was 
"initially" searched for weapons and none was found. (R. 168). 
Then, the Appellant was searched further under the mistaken 
belief that such a search was authorized by the warrant. Deputy 
Conforti stated that "after it was determined that he (Ayala) was 
a resident of the house, I felt that he fell under the jurisdic-
tion of the search warrant in conducting a more thorough search." 
(R. 168). Under no circumstances does an individual "fall under 
the jurisdiction of a warrant" unless they are named in the 
warrant. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has con-
tinuously rejected the argument that evidence searches of persons 
who are on the premises subject to a search warrant should be 
permitted where police have a "reasonable belief that such per-
sons" are connected with 'drug trafficking' and may be concealing 
or carrying away the contraband." Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94. Nor did 
Summers extend the Terry exception to the "evidence gathering" 
function: "individualized probable cause is still a 
"prerequisite to an evidence search of any person on the 
premises." Broadnaxf 654 P.2d at 104. 
The Summers rule only allows occupants to be "detained" 
under a warrant authorizing a search of the premises. The court 
in Summers was careful to make the distinction between a 
"detention" and a "search." It notes: 
In this casef only the detention is at issue. 
The police knew respondent lived in the house 
and they did not search him until after they 
had probable cause to arrest him and had done so. 
Summers at 676 n.4 (emphasis added). 
Deputy Conforti specifically establishes that he was not 
searching the Appellant incident to arrest but was searching him 
pursuant to the search warrant which was clearly not authorized. 
Even assuming the search was not conducted pursuant to the 
warrant, there was no evidence to establish probable cause to 
arrest the Appellant at the time of the search of his person. 
The evidence found on the Appellant during the "more thorough" 
search of his person cannot be used to establish probable cause. 
"[0]ne cannot search first to gather evidence to establish pro-
bable cause needed to justify the initial intrusion. Otherwise, 
the requirement of probable cause to arrest would be turned 
upside down." Broadnax, at 102. 
In addition, other evidence eventually found during the 
search cannot establish probable cause if it is discovered after 
the search of a defendant. The court in Broadnax found that 
the discovery of controlled substances in the bedroom of the 
residence could not serve to establish probable cause to arrest 
or search the defendant in that case because "that evidence was 
found after the search of petitioner had already been completed 
and thus could not form the basis for the initial intrusion of 
petitioners1 right of privacy." Id. at 103. 
Because the Appellant was searched pursuant to the warrant, 
the search of his person was illegal under the well established 
rule of Ybarra that an authorized search of a premises does not 
likewise authorize the search of a person found on the premises. 
Assuming arguendo that the search was not made pursuant to the 
warrant, Summers only allows for the "detention" of an individual, 
not a "search" and requires that a search be made only incident 
to arrest. In this case, the Appellant was searched before he 
was arrested and before probable cause had been established to 
arrest him. Under Ybarra and Summers then, the search of the 
Appellant violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, therefore the evidence 
derived as a result should be suppressed. 
III. THE SEIZURE OF UNITED STATES CURRENCY AND 
A SOFT PLASTIC BAG CONTAINING BALLOONS WITH 
A POWDERY SUBSTANCE WAS NOT A LEGITIMATE 
SEIZURE PURSUANT TO A "PAT DOWN" SEARCH. 
The evidence in this case is uncontroverted that officers 
from the Metropolitan Narcotics Squad contacted the Appellant 
when he arrived at a home where the officers were in the process 
of executing a search warrant (R. 285 p. 24). Upon arrival at the 
residence in question, the Appellant attempted to make inquiry of 
the officers as to what was going on, and he was placed up 
against a wall and "patted down" in a search for weapons (R. 168, 
R. 285 p. 26). The evidence is further uncontrovered that at 
that point the officers pulled a number of bills of United States 
currency and a small plastic bag containing approximately 96 
balloons each of which contained small amounts of a powdery 
substance from the jacket pockets of the Appellant during this 
pat-down search (R. 285 p. 26, 28). It is clear that at the time 
the Appellant was searched he was not under arrest, since the 
police officers had found nothing incriminating prior to the 
search of his person, and did not have the name of the Appellant 
as an individual for whom they had probable cause to believe had 
committed any crime (App. B). It is clear that the act of arrest 
had not occurred, but that the officers were merely searching the 
Appellant for weapons to protect themselves, a proposition the 
lower court clearly ruled on previously in Appellant's favor (R. 
149). It is Appellant's contention that while the officers were 
allowed to pat him down to determine whether or not he possessed 
a weapon and therefore could be a threat to the officers, that it 
was a violation of his rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution for them to have seized soft items 
which could not possibly have been weapons during this alleged 
"pat-down" search (See Judge Wilkinson's Minute Entryf App. C). 
U.C.A. § 77-7-16 (1953) authorizes a peace officer to frisk 
a person for dangerous weapons if he reasonably believes that he 
or any other person is in danger. This particular statute is an 
exception to the general requirement that police obtain a warrant 
for all searches. See Const. Utah, Art. I, § 14 and U.S. Const. 
4th Amend. However, in State v. Roybal, 716 P.2d 291 (1986) the 
Utah Suoreme Court observed: 
"The section (77-7-16) must be interpreted to 
meet the constitutional requirements of Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 28 L.Ed 2d 
889 (1968). In that case, the Supreme Court 
established a narrowly drawn exception to 
the requirement that police obtain a warrant 
for all searches." 
716 P.2d at 292. 
In the instant case, Appellant does not dispute the fact 
that when he arrived at a scene where the police officers were 
executing a search warrant, the police officers had a right to 
pat him down pursuant to the standard enunciated by Terry v. Ohio 
and U.C.A. § 77-7-16 in order to determine whether or not he 
possessed a dangerous weapon which would threaten the safety of 
police officers. Appellant asserts however, that once the police 
officers were able to pat him down and determine that he did not 
possess a hard object such as a gun or knifef that their search 
must have ended at that point. They were not allowed to feel 
soft objects or soft bulges and go into the pockets of Appellant 
to obtain evidence. Even the limited intrusion into the right of 
privacy of the Appellant under such warrantless circumstances 
allowed by Terry is justified only by the officers1 fear that the 
individual may possess a weapon. 
In Roybal, the Utah Supreme Court found that a "limited pat-
down" of defendant's beltline to obtain a weapon that police 
officers had reason to believe was concealed behind the defen-
dant's back, was an appropriate seizure considering all of the 
facts and circumstances known to the officer at the time the 
search was made. Through this limited search, the officer felt a 
hard object which he then pulled out of the defendant's waistband, 
and said hard object was a loaded pistol. (716 P.2d at 292-293). 
In Roybal, the Supreme Court clearly established the propo-
sition that, all police officers can dof even when they have 
reason to believe that the defendant is armed, is to conduct a 
"limited pat-down" to determine whether or not the defendant is 
armed. Counsel has found no Utah Supreme Court case which 
directly deals with the situation where a police officer feels a 
soft object during this limited pat-down search, but Roybal makes 
clear that the purpose of such a limited pat-down search is to 
help the officer determine whether or not there is something that 
can harm the officer, specifically, a weapon. Other jurisdic-
tions have dealt directly with the "soft object" issue and have 
ruled very squarely in favor of the proposition that a peace 
officer who feels a soft object during a limited pat-down search 
for weapons cannot remove such soft object without further facts 
or circumstances which would justify a search of the Defendant 
independent of the search for weapons. 
In United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520 (2nd Cir. 1972) 
the Court of Appeals held that where a police officer, in con-
ducting a justifiable frisk for weapons, felt in the handkerchief 
pocket of suspect's suitcoat a folded ten dollar bill; the 
officer did not have authority under the "pat-down" exception of 
Terry v. Ohio to remove the object and inspect its contents, even 
though the officer had testified that when he first felt the 
object he feared that a knife or possibly a razor blade could 
have been contained inside the soft object. In Tinney v. Wilson, 
408 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1969), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that the actions of a police officer whose initial 
search for weapons of the defendant who was found in an automo-
bile of a girl arrested for prostitution, although constitu-
tionally valid at its inception, became invalid when the officer 
squeezed a small, soft object and then removed such object from 
the defendant's pocket, since the search should have been con-
fined in scope to intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, 
knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for assault on the 
officer. 
In United States v. Prim, 698 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1983), the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a case later than Tinney, upheld 
its earner ruling and suppressed evidence presented by the pro-
secution during the course of defendant's narcotics trial where 
police officers had obtained a manila envelope containing nar-
cotics when they were merely conducting a pat-down search of the 
defendant. Tn that casef the drug agents had no probable cause 
to arrest the defendant, but had reason to believe the defendant 
may have been in possession of narcotics. Therefore, the police 
officers used the pretext of a pat-down search to seize the soft 
envelope containing a soft powdery substance later identified as 
cocaine. In that case, the Court stated: 
" . . . The whole objective of the pat down was 
not aimed at a weapon search to protect against 
danger as permitted under Terry, but instead 
was conducted with the expectation of finding 
narcotics. Therefore, there was no justifica-
tion for a pat-down and the pat-down conducted 
exceeded the permissable scope of a weapons 
search. (Citing U.S. v. Del Toro, supra) 
Thus, the manila envelope was seized as a 
result of an illegal pat-down and should have 
been suppressed." 
698 F.2d at 977. 
In United States v. Gonzales, 319 F.Supp 56 3 (U.S. D.C. 
Conn. 1970) the Court held that where a defendant was arrested at 
night in a high crime area preparing to exit from a car, it was 
possible that he might have tossed a weapon to his friend who was 
being arrested and therefore the initial frisk of the defendant 
was not unreasonable; but when the officer felt in defendant's 
pocket a soft packet wrapped in cellophane, a further search con-
ducted on the theory that there might have been a razor blade 
hidden in the packet was unreasonable and the packet containing 
heroin was ordered suppressed. This case has particular signifi-
cance to the instant case in that Appellant's pocket contained a 
cellophane bag with soft balloons. The police officer has never 
enunciated a fear that there might have been any sort of object 
hidden in the packet; but even if he had done so, the Gonzales 
case stands for the proposition that such a fear in a soft object 
situation would be unreasonable and the evidence would be 
suppressed since it was beyond the limits of the Terry pat-down 
search limitations. See also, U.S. v. Reid, 351 F.Supp 714 
(U.S.D.C. Ed. N.Y. 1972). 
The state courts have been as consistent as the federal 
courts in significantly limiting the scope of pat-down searches. 
In People v. Collins, 463 P.2d 403 (Cal. 1970) the court held 
that in searching a legally detained individual reasonably 
suspected of being armed, a police officer must be limited to a 
careful exploration of the outer surfaces of the person's 
clothing until and unless he discovers specific and articulable 
facts reasonably supporting his suspicion. The court also held 
that the burden of pointing to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences thereto, reasonably 
warranted a search of a suspect's clothing, properly rested with 
the government. The Court specifically said: 
"Feeling a soft object in a suspect's pocket 
during a pat-down, absent unusual circumstances, 
does not warrant an officer's intrusion into a 
suspect's pocket to retrieve the object. A 
pat-down must be confined in scope to an 
intrusion reasonably designed to discover 
guns, knives, clubs or other hidden instruments 
for the assault of the police officer. 
. . . The obvious purpose of holding that 
officers cannot go beyond exploration of the 
surfaces of a suspect's clothing without being 
able to point to specific and articulable facts 
. . . is to ensure that the scope of such a 
search cannot be exceeded at the mere discre-
tion of an officerf but only upon discovery of 
tactile evidence particularly tending to 
corroborate suspicion that the suspect is 
armed. To permit officers to exceed the scope 
of a lawful pat-down whenever they feel a soft 
object by relying upon mere speculation the 
object might be a razor blade concealed in a 
handkerchief or some other type of atypical 
weapon, invites a plenary search of an indi-
vidual's person. Such a holding would render 
meaningless Terry's requirement that pat-downs 
be limited in scope absent articulable grounds 
for an additional intrusion." 
463 P.2d at 406 (emphasis supplied). 
The California court in Collins clearly held that an officer 
who exceeds a pat-down without first discovering an object which 
feels reasonably like a knife, gun, or clubf must be able to 
point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably support 
a suspicion that the particular suspect is armed with an atypical 
weapon which would feel like the object felt during the pat-down. 
Only then can judges satisfy the Fourth Amendment's requirement 
of a neutral evaluation of the reasonableness of a particular 
search by comparing the facts with the officer's view of those 
facts. See also, Byrd v. Superior Court, 268 Cal.App.2d 49 5; 
People v. Britton, 26 4 Cal.App.2d 711. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington ruled accor-
dingly in the case of State v. Hobart, 617 P.2d 429 (1980). In 
that case, soft items seized from a defendant's pocket were later 
determined to be balloons containing heroin. Again, this case 
has particular significance in the instant matter in that we are 
dealing specifically with balloons containing a white powdered 
substance alleged to be heroin. In Hobarty, the defendant was 
standing on the street when he was recognized by a police officer 
as one who had been arrested previously for possession of mari-
juana and cocaine and for carrying a concealed weapon. The 
officer stated that he knew of the petitioner's prior record and 
for his own safety he got out of the car, asked for iden-
tification, and "patted" the petitioner for weapons. He found 
none, but did detect in the petitioner's shirt pocket two spongy 
objects which he squeezed and concluded were balloons containing 
narcotics. He attempted to reach into the pocket, and removed 
the balloons containing heroin only after a scuffle. The 
Washington Supreme Court recognized the exception to the 
warrantless search provided in the case of Terry v. Ohio but 
pointed out that in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 
1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) the United States Supreme Court said 
that before an officer places a hand on the person of a citizen 
in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, 
reasonable grounds for doing so, and that in the case of the self-
protective search for weapons, he must be able to point to par-
ticular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the 
individual was armed and dangerous. Id. at 431. Using this 
rationale, the Washington Supreme Court suppressed the evidence 
seized from the defendant in that case under the pretext of a pat-
down search. The Court observed that the police officer's 
knowledge of the defendant's prior arrest for carrying a con-
cealed weapon gave him reason to suspect that the defendant was 
armed and therefore it was appropriate for him to conduct the 
"pat-down" search for weapons. The Court then went on to say: 
"Howeverf from his own description of the search 
which he made, it is evident that its scope was 
not strictly limited to a search for weapons, 
but included also an exploration of the possibility 
that the defendant might be in possession of nar-
cotics. Having discovered 'spongy' objects (which 
could not reasonably be feared as dangerous weapons) 
in the defendant's pockets, the officer squeezed 
them with the obvious purpose of ascertaining 
whether they had th£ shape and consistency of 
balloons commonly used for narcotics. Such a search 
reaches beyond the scope permitted under the Fourth 
Amendment adding to the search for weapons a search 
for evidence of a crime." 
617 P.2d at 433, 434 (emphasis added). 
The Washington Supreme Court went on to say "we are aware of no 
instance in which the Supreme Court has condoned the use of a 
frisk to search for evidence of an independent crime. . . To 
approve the use of evidence of some offense unrelated to weapons 
would be to invite the use of weapons' searches as a pretext 
for unwarranted searches, and thus to severely erode the protec-
tion of the Fourth Amendment. Such a step this court is not pre-
pared to take." 617 P.2d at 434. 
In the instant case, officers reached in Appellant's pocket 
and removed a soft cellophane bag containing common balloons with 
a powdery substance and soft folding currency. No "hard" objects 
were retrieved. Appellant maintains that if this Court condones 
this warrantless search under the guise of a "pat-down" search, 
the door would be opened for police officers to use weapons 
searches as a pretext for unwarranted searches for evidence and 
would fall squarely within the concerns expressed by every court 
that has ever dealt with this issue. 
In People v. McCarty, 296 NE.2d 862 (1973) the Appellate 
Court of the State of Illinois clearly ruled that where police 
officers during a pat-down search for weapons removed a soft 
plastic bag from a pocket of the defendant, such seizure was 
invalid and the evidence obtained from the soft plastic bag could 
not be used against the defendant in trial. Further, the Court 
of Appeals of the State of Georgia in Holtzendorf v. State, 188 
SE.2d 879 (1972) ruled that officers who removed marijuana in a 
very small plastic bag under a packet of cigarettes from the 
shirt of the defendant under the pretext of a pat-down search, had 
violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, and reversed the 
conviction and ordered the suppression of such evidence. 
Further, in Blackburn v. Florida, 414 SO.2d 651 (1982) the 
District Court of Appeals of Florida ruled that "Even assuming a 
police officer had reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of 
the defendant, it was not permissible for him to seize a stocking 
in defendant's shirt pocket, and the arrest of the defendant 
based on the seizure of the stocking was invalid, as was the 
resulting search of the defendant's automobile." Further, in 
Dunn v. Florida, 382 SO.2d 727 (1980) the District Court of 
Appeals of Florida ruled that an officer who, during the course 
of a lawful stop and frisk of the defendant, felt an object 
suspected to be marijuana, did not have the right to seize it 
where the officer had no belief that the object might be a 
weapon. And finally, in People v. Cobbin, 692 P.2d 1069 (Colo. 
1984) the Colorado Supreme Court held that once a legitimate pat-
down search has determined that the suspect is not armed, the 
police may not once again search the suspect and confiscate the 
contents of his pockets under the guise of said pat-down search. 
In addition to the overwhelming weight of case law, Wayne R. 
LaFave in his Treatise On The Fourth Amendmenty 2d Ed. 1987, 
indicates very clearly that under the prevailing view of evidence 
and search and seizure law, "A search is not permissible when the 
object felt is soft in nature. Even if the object felt is hardf 
the question is whether its size or density is such that it might 
be a weapon." LaFave at 523 § 9.4(c). 
The overwhelming weight of authority on the subject of pat-
down searches makes clear that police officers may not, during 
the course of a Terry stop and frisk situation, remove soft 
objects from a suspect's pocket unless thay have some articulable 
basis to believe that the object removed is a weapon. In the 
instant case, police officers violated the rights of the 
Appellant under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution by seizing 
soft objects from his pocket under circumstances where such soft 
objects could not possibly have been weapons. The officers 
clearly exceeded the scope of their pat-down search and began an 
exploratory search of the Appellant for evidence. 
IV. ALL ALLEGED INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS OF THE 
APPELLANT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED SINCE APPELLANT 
COULD NOT SPEAK ENGLISH WELL ENOUGH TO UNpER-
STAND THE NATURE OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS, NgRjTO 
ENTER VALID WAIVER THERETO, 
In Mij^nda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 
L.Ed.2d 694 (1966 ) f the United States Supreme Court held that 
before a custodial interrogation may be conducted with a criminal 
suspect, the suspect must be informed of his right to have an 
attorney and to have a court-appointed attorney if he could not 
afford to hire one. Furthermore, the Court ruled that the 
suspect must be informed that everything he says could be used 
against him in a court of law and that he has the right to remain 
silent. Finally, the Court ruled that a person must knowingly 
and intelligently waive his right to remain silent and to have an 
attorney present before he may be interrogated by police offi-
cers. The U.S. Supreme Court clearly held that custodial 
interrogations are presumed to be involuntary unless the suspect 
is warned of his rights. In U.S. v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 1227 
(9th Cir. 1978), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
amplified the Miranda language by saying: 
"We assume without so holding that if Miranda 
warnings are given in a language which the 
person being so instructed does not under-
stand, a waiver of those rights would not be 
valid. . . ". 
588 F.2d at 1235. 
There are very few cases dealing with the language problem 
involved with the Miranda warning and the waiver of Miranda 
rights. This is undoubtedly due to the fact unac wnere une 
government fails to meet its burden of showing that the defendant 
clearly and knowingly understood the rights he was being given 
and knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, any state-
ment made by the defendant would have to be suppressed. Any time 
police officers deal with a suspect whom they do not believe 
speaks good English, they cannot simply assume that he under-
stands the Miranda warning when they read it to him and that a 
nod of his head or some other affirmation means that he knowingly 
and intelligently waives his right to remain silent. What police 
officers should do when they are dealing with Spanish-speaking 
subjects was pointed out by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit in the case of U.S. v. Elles-Martinez, 761 F.2d 1 
(1st Cir. 1985). In that case, Spanish-speaking crew members 
were arrested by the Coast Guard for smuggling. After their 
arrest, the crew members were informed of their Miranda rights in 
Spanish and the officers obtained acknowledgements of the rights 
from each defendant. Furthermore, each defendant was presented 
with a Miranda Rights Waiver form in the Spanish language upon 
which they individually signed an affirmation of having read and 
understood their rights. Prior to the booking process, they were 
again individually informed of their rights in Spanish, and even 
though some members of the crew knew some words of English, the 
government agents dealing with the defendants realized that in 
order to obtain a valid waiver, the defendants must be informed 
of their rights in Spanish. Their extra efforts in placing the 
Miranda warning in writing in Spanish and obtaining written 
waivers thereof, were sufficient to pass the standards of the 
Miranda case and the Ninth Circuit refused to suppress the defen-
dants1 statements on the grounds that the individual defendants 
did not understand and voluntarily waive their rights giv€>n to 
them in Spanish since it was given to them with a Mexican accent 
and they were actually Panamanian. 
In the instant case, it is clear that the police officers 
ma(
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 no effort whatsoever to give the Appellant his Miranda 
warning in Spanish. For the officers to testify that they gave 
the warning in English and obtained a waiver in English is 
clearly insufficient to establish that the Appellant knowingly 
and intelligently waived his rights pursuant to the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
In the instant case, officers knew Appellant was a Mexican 
citizen who was in the country illegally (R. 285 p.40). They could 
tell he had at least some difficulty with the English language 
(R.285 p. 79; R.284 p. 26). In Coyote v. U.S., 380 F.2d 305 (10th 
Cir. 1967) the U.S. Court of Appealsf Tenth Circuit observed: 
"Surely Miranda is not a ritual of words to be 
recited by rote according to didactic niceties. 
What Miranda does require is meaningful advice 
to the unlettered and unlearned in language 
which he can comprehend and on which he can 
knowingly act. We will not indulge semantical 
debates between counsel over the particular 
words to inform an individual of his rights. 
The crucial test is whether' the words in the 
context used, considering the age, background 
and intelligence of the individual being 
interrogated, impart a clear, understandable 
warning of all of his rights." 
380 F.2d at 308 (emphasis supplied). 
In a subsequent case, U.S. v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371 (10th 
Cir. 1984), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit indi-
cated that the concept of informing the defendant of his rights 
is but one of a two-part procedure required by the Constitution 
before statements made by a defendant in a custodial setting may 
be introduced as evidence against him in a subsequent trial. The 
second step is making certain that the defendant waives his 
rights knowingly and intelligently. The Tenth Circuit, in order 
to emphasize their holding in Obregon, opined: 
"Law enforcement officials may find it desirable 
in the future, in order.to avoid the problem 
presented here, to utilize two distinct forms, 
one perhaps captioned 'Advice of Rights1 form 
setting forth one's rights under Miranda with a 
signatory line for acknowledgement that he or she 
has read the statement of rights and understands 
the same, and a second form perhaps captioned 
"Waiver of Rights' (making clear that the defendant 
is knowingly and intelligently waiving his or her 
Miranda rights). This approach may eliminate any 
confusion existing between the concepts of 
'understanding rights' and 'waiver of rights'. 
748 F.2d at 1381. 
It seems very clear then that a defendant who speaks little 
if any English cannot be expected to fully and completely under-
stand the Miranda warning, and especially cannot be expected to 
knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. 
Another critical reason officers should obtain a knowing 
and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights involves the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. In the recent case of Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 476, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981), Justice White 
writing for the majority talked in terms of the waiver of the 
right to counsel as being one of the essential elements of the 
Miranda warning. The Court reversed a decision by the Supreme 
Court of Arizona and held: 
"It is reasonably clear under our cases that 
waivers of counsel must not only be voluntaryf 
but must also constitute a knowing and intelli-
gent relinquishment or abandonment of a known 
right or privilegef a matter which depends in 
each case 'upon the particular facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding that case, including the 
background, experience and conduct of the 
accused.' (citing cases) . . . We note that in 
denying petitioner's motion to suppress, the 
trial court found the admission to have been 
'voluntary' without separately focusing on 
whether Edwards had knowingly and intelligently 
relinquished his right to counsel." 
451 U.S. at 483. 
The Supreme Court pointed out in the Edwards decision that 
not only should the court's inquiry involving suppression of con-
fessions concern the "voluntariness" of the defendant's state-
ments, but also, whether or not the defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to counsel as well as his right to 
remain silent. Even if the defendant understood that he had the 
right to remain silent and chose to speak anyway, the court must 
also determine whether or not he understood that he had the right 
to have counsel present during interrogation, and that one could 
be appointed for him if he could not afford to hire one. 
In the instant case, it seems clear that even if this Court 
were to find that the Appellant had voluntarily decided to make 
a statement to police officers, that there must be a showing on 
the part of the State that he knowingly and intelligently waived 
his right to counsel. Where, as in the case at bar, the police 
officers do not bother to obtain an interpreter for purposes of 
being certain the Appellant is understanding what they are 
telling him, and where they choose not to have the Appellant 
execute a waiver of his Miranda rights in writing in his native 
language, the state cannot possibly meet the burden of proving 
that the Appellant knowingly and intelligently waived both his 
Constitutional right to remain silent and his Constitutional right 
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
V. STATEMENTS MADE BY THE DEFENDANT AFTER HE 
INVOKED HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO REMAIN 
SILENT SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
As stated earlier, in Miranda v. Arizonay supra, the United 
States Supreme Court provided safeguards to protect the constitu-
tional rights of persons subjected to custodial police interroga-
tion. Unless law enforcement officers give specific warning 
prior to questioning and follow specific procedures thereafter, 
any statements made by the person in custody are not admissible 
at trial even if the statement is voluntary. Michigan v. Mosley, 
423 U.S. 96, 100 (1965). 
The issue in this case involved statements made by the 
defendant while in custody after being given Miranda warnings. 
The procedure to be followed once warnings have been given was 
also established in Miranda: 
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent 
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates, 
in any manner, at any time, prior to or during 
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, 
the interrogation must cease. 
Miranda, at 473-74 (emphasis added). 
Implicit in this passage is the recognition that renewed 
questioning can eventually operate to overcome the will of an 
accused. Left unanswered in Miranda was the question of "under 
what circumstances, if any, "would a resumption of questioning be 
permissible." Mosley, at 101. The court answered this question 
in Mosley concluding that "the admissibility of statements 
obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent 
depends under Miranda on whether his 'right to cut-off 
questioning1 was 'scrupulously honored." Mosley, at 104. 
I n
 Mosley, the defendant charged with robbery, was given 
Miranda warnings and invoked his right to remain silent by stating 
that he did not wish to answer any questions at that time. Two 
hours later, after being given a second set of full and complete 
Miranda warnings, Mosley was questioned about an unrelated 
murder. The court found that the subsequent questions did not 
"undercut" the accused's previous decison because: (1) a "fresh" 
set of warnings were given and (2) the questioning concerned an 
"unrelated" offense. Mosely at 105. 
The issue in this case then turns on whether the Appellant's 
right to remain silent was "scrupulously honored" as required by 
Miranda and Mosley. Under Mosley, resumed questioning must be 
accompanied by a "fresh" set of warnings and must be "unrelated" 
to the charged offense. 
In response to being given Miranda warnings, the Appellant 
in this case clearly invoked his right to remain silent by 
stating that "he did not wish to answer questions at that time." 
(R.284 p. 28; R. 163). Five minutes later, without new Miranda 
warnings, Deputy Conforti resumed questioning the Appellant. He 
asked "How long have you been living in this house?" (R. 170-171). 
To which the Appellant responded that "he had been living there 
approximately six months and that he and the other two that had 
arrived with him were illegal aliens from Mexico." (R. 171). 
Then the officer asked which "other two" he was referring to as 
they had arrested five persons that night (R. 171). 
An hour and a half later en route to the jail, Deputy 
Labrum again resumed extensive interrogation without new Miranda 
warnings. The following questions were asked: (1) How much 
Appellant was paying for rent; (2) If he had any idea how much he 
made from the sale of heroin; (3) How much Appellant felt he had 
made over the last six months from the sale of heroin while he 
had been at that residence (R. 283 p. 102); (4) What he was going 
to do with the money; (5) Why he didn't send (to Mexico) s;mall 
parts of the money a little bit at a time to his relatives; and 
(6) Why he was sending it all at once (R. 283 p. 102). 
These questions were not preceded by a "fresh set of 
warnings" nor were they "unrelated" to the offense the Appellant 
was charged with as required under Mosley. Therefore, the 
Appellant's right to remain silent was not scrupulously honored. 
Moreover, these questions were clearly designed to "elicit 
an incriminating response." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U„S. 291 
(1980); Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1984). If an 
incriminating response is made in response to any type of 
interrogation, after a defendant has invoked his right to remain 
silent, it is inadmissible. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
473-474 (196); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1980); Anderson 
v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96 (2nd Cir. 1984). Voluntary statements not 
made in response to interrogation are admissible. Rhode Island 
v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). In Innis, the United States 
Supreme Court established the standard for determining when 
resumed questioning constitutes "interrogation" requiring a fresh 
set of warnings: 
The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever 
a person in custody is subjected to either 
express questioning or its functional equivalent. 
That is to sayf the term 'interrogation1 under 
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, 
but also to words or actions on the part of 
police (other than those normally attendant to 
arrest and custody) that the police should know 
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response from the suspect. 
Innis, at 300-301 (emphasis added). 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Anderson v. Smithf supraf applied the Innis standard in finding 
that the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was 
violated by resumed questioning. Anderson at 103. In that case, 
the state argued that the defendant's statements were voluntary 
because he "obviously" knew how to invoke his right to remain 
silent having done so previously. :id. at 102. The burden is not 
on the accused to invoke his right a second time however. 
"[Slcrupulously honoring a suspect's right 
for a few hours does not lessen the impact 
of subsequent coercive questioning. The 
police must honor the suspect's rights at 
all times." 
Id. at 103. 
In the instant case, Deputy Conforti specifically states 
that the statements made by the defendant were not volunteered 
but were "in response to a question." (R. 170-171). These 
questions then constitute an "interrogation" under the Innis 
standard as they were clearly designed to "elicit an incrimi-
nating response" concerning the very subject on which the 
Appellant had invoiced his right to remain silent. Anderson, at 
103. Innis prohibits this kind of questioning without the safe-
guards provided by Miranda. Therefore the statements were taker 
in violation of the Appellant's Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent and should be suppressed. 
At the trial of this matter, the court persisted in u s 
rulings that statements by the Appellant after he had invoked his 
Constitutional right to remain silent should not be admissible in 
the State's case in chief. However, after the Appellant was 
called as a witness to testify on his own behalf at the trial, 
the prosecuting attorney asked questions of him on cross-
examination and later presented previously ruled involuntary sta-
tements of the Appellant to a Detective Jay Labrum on the way to 
jail that night, as rebuttal evidence against the Appellant (R. 
283 p. 88-102). Appellant's counsel strenuously objected to the 
introduction of such evidence (R. 28 3 p. 87). The court however, 
ruled that Detective Labrum's testimony regarding the involuntary 
statements of the Appellant would be admissible for rebuttal and 
impeachment purposes. 
Although the Appellant cannot quarrel with the general rule 
laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Harris v. New York, 
401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971), Appellant argues 
that Harris allowed impeachment by the use of these unmirandized 
statements only for purposes of attacking credibility and not as 
evidence of his guilt. In fact, in Harris, the jury was 
instructed that it could consider the Appellant's prior incon-
sistent statements "only in passing on (his) credibility and not 
as evidence of his guilt". Harris, supra, at 223. 
In the instant case, the jury was not so instructed by the 
court and thus, the jury may have used the unmirandized statement 
of Appellant to Officer Labrum for purposes of determining his 
guilt and not for purposes of simply attacking his credibility. 
In addition, Appellant steadfastly denied that he had ever said 
such things to Officer Labrum, nor that he was capable of saying 
such things to Labrum since he did not understand English well 
enough to be able to do so (R. 283 p. 58, 59). 
Further, Appellant submits that his testimony generally 
denying the crime in question did not open the door for the pro-
secution to bring in specific testimony it brought in through 
Officer Labrum. 
VI. DEFENDANT AYALA'S STATEMENTS WERE "FRUIT OF 
THE POISONOUS TREE" AND SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED. 
An additional issue to be confronted by the Court involves 
the fact that the statements made by the Appellant regarding 
controlled substances came after police officers violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution and his 
rights under Art. I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution to be free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures, in that the alleged pat-
down search exceeded the limitations allowed by Terry v. Ohio 
as indicated in Points If II and III of this Brief. In Oregon v. 
Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985) the U.S. Supreme Court clearly held 
that evidence discovered as a result of a search in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from evidence when the 
fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation is a confession. The Court 
pointed out that where a Fourth Amendment violation taints the 
confession, a finding of voluntariness for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment is merely a threshhold requirement in determining 
whether the confession may be admitted into evidence andf beyond 
that, the prosecution must show a sufficient break in events to 
undermine the inference that the confession was caused by the 
Fourth Amendment violation. The Court once again reiterated the 
principle that the Miranda case stands for the proposition that 
there is a presumption of coercion in any custodial interrogation 
setting, and it is the duty of the prosecution to remove the pre-
sumption by showing the defendant has been appropriately advised 
of his Miranda rights and has knowingly and intelligently waived 
them. See also, Wong-Sun v. U.S., 371 U.S. 471. 
The statements allegedly made by the Appellant in the above-
entitled matter are statements which apparently resulted from the 
fact that police officers had located a quantity of items which 
they believed to be heroin. The Appellant was then placed in the 
position of attempting to explain the circumstances andf despite 
the fact that he understood very little English, attempted to do 
so to the police officers. These statements of the Appellant 
were clearly the result of the impermissible search of his person 
by police officers and therefore should be suppressed on the 
ground that they were "fruit of the poisonous tree". 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, Appellant requests that the Court reverse his 
conviction and order the Third District Court to dismiss the case 
against him, or to grant him a new trial. If a new trial is 
granted, Appellant requests that the Court enter an Order indi-
cating that the 96 balloons containing a white powdery substance 
identified as heroin and $1,320.00 in cash seized from his jacket 
pockets be excluded from evidence in his new trial. In addition, 
Appellant requests that the Court enter an Order indicating that 
all statements made by him after he invoked his right to remain 
silent, and particularly, his statements to Officer Labrum, 
should be suppressed and excluded from his new trial. 
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ADDENDUM 
T.l. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorney 
Courtside Offite Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) : ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Eleanor ~VaTr-5<Mrve-r 450 South 2nd East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 8853 Julia Lane (3255 South), 
yellow brick, yellow wood on front. White siding on 
sides and a split entry. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Heroin, cutting agents, weighing and packaging materials, transaction 
ledgers and other related controlled substances and/or devices. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. [Mete requirements of Utah Code 
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)] 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crimefs) of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH 
[STENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE. 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to'establish the grounds for issuance of a Search *t 
are: ' **** 
Your affiant, a defective with the Salt Lake County s%* , 
Narcotics Unit states: * 
Your affiant made arrangements for a Confidential !*-for*wU 
to make a controlled drug buy at the residence of 8853 J u U s 'moc^ 
_^ Salt Lake County. The C.I. was given a body search by detectiri| L. 
\\ the Narcotics Unit, under the direction of your affiant. j£\ 
^ 7 controlled substances or U.S. currency were found. Your affia~- ^ ^ ^ 
!4^^ave the C.I. a predetermined amount of money. 
t>V ^ ; ) Within the last seven (7) days the C.I. was transport. 
&J*the area of 8853 Julia Lane. The C I . was observed enteri-;J ^T 
/^vresidence and exit it a short time later; times being record* £7 
v x
,your affiant. The C.I. was never out of the visual contact (^i^f 
"'for when inside the residence of 8853 Julia Lane) of the affiant ^j[ 
other detectives. The C.l. turned over to your affiant a quanta,
 pt(* 
heroin that the C.I. stated had been purchased inside the resi<S~,# 
The heroin was field tested and flashed positive by u s e °* -Mt<_ 
Beetin-Dickinson Field Test Kit. The C.L was again gaven a com:^ t > 
body search and no controlled substances or U.S. currency were foun* 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidently 
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from *» 
unnamed source) .,
 n 
Another C.I> has stated that drugs, specifically heroin
 t% 
and has ~ STen sold" out of the residence of 8853 Julia Lane for sc*# 
t ime. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a'Search Warrant be issued for th* 
seizure of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there t* reason t* 
believe it is necessary to seize the property VTlor t0 lt 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for 
other good reasons, to-wit: 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executHf 
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the otticer * 
authority or purpose because: 
(X) physical harm nay result to any person if notice were 
given; or .. . 
(X) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposes 
of, or secreted. 
PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
This danger is beHjWfee<h-Tcr^e^l st because: 
Another C^ T-*—h*-s~""seen on different occasions weapons Inside 
the residence and knows that & handgun is inside the residence* 
AFFIAN: 
y,#&-
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORtf TO BEFORE ME this 
r 
'fc A; lajc^o 
-xo/>-
f January, 1986. 
/~ 
7//< 
S^ V 
i Ci y -^'"'U r-
JUDGE IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
T.L; "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
By: MICHAEL J. CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County* Attorney 
Courtside Office Building 
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY5 STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
John Conforti - Salt Lake County Sheriff's Narcotics Division, I am 
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 88S3 Julia Lane (3255 South), 
yellow brick, yellow wood on front. White siding on 
sides and a split entry. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
4eroin, cutting agents, weighing and packaging materials, transaction 
ledgers and other related controlled substances and/or devices. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to 
the illegal conduct. [Note requirements cf Utah Code 
A n n o t a t e d , 7 7 - 2 3 - 3 ( 2 ) ] 
Af f iant b e l i e v e s the proper ty and e v i d e n c e d e s c r i b e d above i s 
ev idence of t h e c r i m e ( s ) of POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH 
[NTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE, 
PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
t o make a <search of the above-named or d e s c r i b e d p e r s o n ( s ) f 
v e h i c l e ( s ) , and premise s for the h e r e i n - a b o v e d e s c r i b e d proper ty or 
e v i d e n c e and i f you f ind the same or any par t t h e r e o f , to br ing i t 
f o r t h w i t h b e f o r e «e a t the F i f t h C i r c u i t Court , County of S a l t Lake, 
S t a t e of U t a h , or r e t a i n such p r o p e r t y in your c u s t o d y , s u b j e c t t o 
the o r d e r of t h i s c o u r t . 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated t h i s January, 1986. 
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